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Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe I Gazownictwo 
PGNiG, WSE: PGN 
 
Expected FCF / Share: PLN (Polish Zloty) 6.91 (13.46% Gain) 
Investment Decision: HOLD 
 
Company Name 
Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe I 
Gazownictwo  
Date 03/07/17 
Fiscal year ends (current period) 12/31/2016 (Q1) 
Current Price 6.09 PLN 
52 week high (date) 6.43 PLN (03/02/17) 
52 week low (date) 4.55 PLN (11/18/16) 
Market Cap PLN 35,190M 
Shares Outstanding 5,778M 
Current P/E 16.38 
Cash 5,553M PLN 
Price / Book 1.05 
2013 EPS 0.350 PLN 
2014 EPS 0.480 PLN 
2015 EPS 0.390 PLN 
2016 EPS (Estimated) 0.370 PLN 
Total Debt (Short Term + Long 
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Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe I Gazownictwo (PGNiG, WSE: PGN) is a 
Polish state-controlled oil and natural gas company which deals with the 
exploration, production, import, storage, distribution, and sales of natural gas and 
crude oil. PGNiG is one of the largest companies in Poland and is listed on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. The company is part of the WIG20 Index, a 
capitalization-weighted stock market index of the twenty largest companies on 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The market currently prices PGNiG at 6.09 Polish 
Zloty (PLN) per share (as of 03/07/19).  To assess the value of PGNiG, we have 
implemented a Probabilistic Discounted Cash Flow Model (PDCF) to determine a 
fundamental value of approximately 6.91 PLN/share. This is an estimated gain of 
approximately 13.46%. The valuation is driven by the anticipated growth of 
PGNiG’s Exploration & Production (E&P) and Trade & Storage (T&S) business 
segments, both of which showed high growth in 2010-2015. To determine the 
certainty of our value estimate, we performed Monte Carlo simulations on our 
PDCF.  Our initial Monte Carlo simulation has high uncertainty, primarily due to 
high variance in historical revenue growth. This high variance in turn is due to a 
high dependence of PGNiG’s business segment revenue on crude oil, the price 
of which fluctuated heavily in early 2016. Crude oil prices have rallied since early 
2016, but remain low relative to pre-2014 levels.  Thus, it comes as no surprise 
that the fundamental value of the business is dependent on the price of oil and 
we recommend a cautious investment rating of HOLD until there is more 








Figure 1: PGNiG (WSE: PGN) stock performance over the last five years 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal, Command <GP> 
 
Catalysts and Risks 
 
Catalysts 
• Negotiations for Électricité de France S.A. (EDF) assets in Poland; 
o EDF is a French electric utility company and owns four power 
plants in Poland; 
• Poland consumes the 4th most natural gas in Europe, behind Germany, 
Spain, and Belgium; 
• Natural Gas demand has grown worldwide (Fig. 2); 
• Increase in heat and electricity prices; 
• Poland is looking to “re-Polonize” industries “at a low cost” according to 
Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Mateusz Morawiecki; 
o “Perhaps [the] power utilities industry is one of them” –Mateusz 
Morawiecki; 
• A 3-year contract with ArcelorMittal to deliver quantity of natural gas 
valued at PLN 1.4bn; 
o The contract is signed from 01/01/2017 through 01/01/2020 but has 
an option to be extended through 2023; 
• PGNiG saw improved operating results in 2016 indicative of a recovering 
oil market; 





• Business performance is highly dependent on prices of (crude) oil; 
o 9-month average of crude oil prices are down 36% year-over year 
(as of Q3 2016); 
• Natural Gas demand has remained constant in Eurasia (Fig. 2); 
• Decreasing tariff price of gas fuel (Fig. 3); 
• Foreign Exchange Risks; 
• Impact of global warming on national temperatures; 
o Sale of gas for heat and electricity is cyclical with seasons – 
revenue from sale of natural gas and heat in the winter is 
substantially higher than in the summer. 
 
 
Figure 2: Demand for natural gas by geographic region  
Source: PGNiG Investor Presentation, December 2016 
 
 
Figure 3: Tariff price of gas fuel and gas price on the PPE 







Company Description and Historical Performance 
 
Company Overview 
PGNiG operates in the energy and natural gas sector and deals with the 
exploration, production, storage, import, distribution, and sales of natural gas. 
The company is state-controlled, and the Poland State Treasury currently owns 
70.83% of shares outstanding. PGNiG is also part of the WIG20, an index of the 
largest 20 companies in Poland, and comprises 4.43% of the index, representing 
the 8th largest share. 
The oil and gas industry as a whole has struggled recently due to the 
deregulation of the natural gas market and the low price of crude oil. 
Deregulation forces PGNiG to decrease their gas fuel tariffs (see above, Fig. 3), 
and low crude oil prices significantly affect PGNiG’s E&P and T&S segment, 
which together generate over 90% of the company’s revenue. 
 
Business Segments and Q1-Q3 2016 Financial Summary 
PGNiG divides its business into 5 main operating segments. For the purposes 
of the PDCF, revenue is estimated for each of these segments, as we believe 
this represents the most realistic indicator of company performance. Financial 
notes for all business segments below compare Q1-Q3 of 2016 to Q1-Q3 of 
2015, unless stated otherwise. All data collected are from PGNiG’s Q3 quarterly 
report for 2016. 
 
• Exploration and Production Segment: Hydrocarbon extraction and 
preparation of products for sale. Includes processes of exploring for and 
extracting natural gas and crude oil from reserves. Also includes 
geological surveys, geophysical research, drilling and development of 
production from reserves. 
o Revenues down by PLN 617M (17%).  
o Poor performance driven by a 5% decline in oil sales volume and a 
fall in crude oil prices (average price of Brent in Q1-Q3 2016 was 
approx. 20% lower than in Q1-Q3 2015). 
o Higher impairment loss on non-current losses (PLN 692M in Q1-Q3 
2016, 136M in Q1-Q3 2015). 
 
• Trade and Storage: Sales of natural gas from either imports or from 
domestic sources, operation of underground gas storage facilities for 
trading, and electricity trading. This segment operates six underground 
gas storage facilities. 
o Revenues down by PLN 3,511M (15.2%). 
o Poor performance driven by increasing deregulation of the natural 
gas market in Poland and decreasing fuel tariffs. 





• Distribution: Includes transmission of natural gas through distribution 
network. 
o Revenues up by PLN 75M (2%) and operating profit up by 11% due 
to an increased volume of distributed natural gas. 
 Average temperature in Poland decreased, increasing the 
demand for gas for heating purposes. 
o Expenses decreased due to a reduction of employee benefits. 
 
• Generation: Generation of sale and electricity and heat. 
o Operating profit increased by PLN 119M to PLN 301M. 
o Higher revenues from sales of heat. 
o Lower procurement costs of coal. 
 
• Other: All other activities that are not classified into the above segments. 
 
Dependence on Crude Oil Prices 
 PGNiG's performance, particularly the performance of its E&P segment, is 
heavily dependent on the price of crude oil. The freefall of oil prices in 2015 
caused total revenue from sale of oil and condensate in 2015 to drop by PLN 
0.7bn (Fig 4). E&P revenue from sales to external customers dropped from PLN 
4.3bn to PLN 3.1bn during that year as well. 
 
 
Figure 4: Decrease in Revenue during FY 2015. Revenues shown are total 
revenues and include inter-segment sales 
Source: PGNiG Investor Presentation, December 2016 
 
 Fig. 4 makes it evident that PGNiG’s operational performance is strongly 
influenced by the price of crude oil. Over the course of 2016, we have seen an 
increase in crude oil price from its low of $29 dollars / barrel in Jan 2016 to $53 / 





Figure 5: WTI Crude Oil Futures through Q1 2017 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal, Command <DES> 
 
Additional upside for the price of oil can be found in the aftermath of the 
OPEC cuts and also in the economic theory of the mean reversion of the oil-gold 
ratio as elaborated on below. Regarding the former, in November of last year, 
OPEC nations agreed to trim output by a collective 1.2 million barrels per day for 
the first half of the year. Based on estimates in January, those nations achieved 
a compliance of 90% with their planned cuts, according to estimates from the 
producer group1. 
Regarding the oil-gold ratio, economic theory suggests that gold maintains 
purchasing power more than other commodities – thus, over long periods of time, 
the prices of other commodities adapt and adjust to the price of gold2. As a 
result, the ratio between the price of gold and the price of another commodity 
reverts to a mean over a long period of time, with the price of gold remaining 
relatively stable and the price of the commodity adapting. Based on analysis by 
Prof. Steve H. Hanke of the Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, 
Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise, the mean of the distribution 
for the oil-gold ratio is approximately 0.065 in $ per bbl / $ per oz. Thus, given a 
current gold spot price of $1228.90 / oz. (as of 03/07/17), we find an estimated oil 
price of $79.88, compared to the current spot price of $52.83. Mean-reversion 
suggests that given the current spot price of gold, the price of oil is expected to 
return to almost $80 / barrel barring additional shocks to the oil and gold markets. 
1 https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-opec-production-targets/ 
2 Hanke, Steve “On the Price of Oil”, Globe Asia May 2016, pp16-18 
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A 50% reversion of this ratio occurs in approximately 13.7 months, suggesting 
that the price of oil should reach close to $70/bbl by the end of 2017. 
This estimated price is in line with oil prices from late 2014 and early 2015. 
Given the heavy reliance of PGNiG’s segment revenue on crude oil prices, this 
suggests that as oil recovers, the company’s business segments should see 
revenues in line with that of its superb FY 2015 and moderate FY 2014. 
However, presently oil prices remain below 2014 levels, so some caution must 
be taken to ensure that our valuation of PGNiG is not fundamentally flawed. 
   
Intersegment Sales 
 PGNiG has 19 direct subsidiaries and 11 indirect subsidiaries. These 
groups are entirely owned by PGNiG, and PGNiG’s business segments often sell 
products to these subsidiaries. For example, the distribution segment generated 
revenue of PLN 654M through sales to external customers but generated PLN 
3.9bn through inter-segment sales. For the purposes of this analysis, we 
estimate future revenue and analyze historical trends using only sales to external 
customers. In published financial statements, PGNiG also eliminates inter-
segment sales from segment revenues as shown below (Fig. 6). 
 
 
Figure 6: Elimination of Intersegment sales 
Source: PGNiG Annual Report, 2015 
 
Historical Performance and Looking Forward 
 In the previous five years, PGNiG stock has outperformed the WIG20 (Fig. 
7a), with particularly strong relative performance of its share price during the 
fiscal years of 2013 and 2015. During a difficult 2016, the company stock 
performed on par with the WIG20 (Fig. 7b), but the rise and stabilization of crude 
oil prices suggests that PGNiG’s performance will improve in the near future.  
 In general, the Polish oil and gas industry is beset by similar problems of 
gas deregulation and low crude oil prices. The key to competitiveness will be the 
ability of these companies to recover. In that aspect, PGNiG has secured an 
excellent contract with ArcelorMittal to supply PLN 1.4bn of natural gas over the 
next three years. Assuming a uniform distribution of this revenue over the 
contract period and assuming that all revenues fall under the T&S business 
segment, this is a 2% flat increase to segment revenue. 
 Additionally, PGNiG seems interested in growing value through 
acquisitions. They are currently negotiating with EDF for the purchase of four 





Figure 7a: 5-year historical trailing return vs. WIG20 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal, Command <COMP> 
 
 
Figure 7b: One-year historical trailing total return vs. WIG20 








 Analysts are equally split among buy, hold, and sell recommendations for 
PGNiG (Fig. 8). Very recently (in Feb 2017), consensus shifted negatively 
compared to Q3-Q4 2016. 
 
Figure 8: Analyst Recommendations 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal, Command <ANR> 
Ratio Performance  
Inspecting the Long Term Asset Turnover Ratio (LTAT = Revenue / Long 
Term Assets [LTA]) and Useful Life (UL = LTA / Depreciation and Amortization 
[D&A]), we see that LTAT grew and UL shrunk between 2010 and 2015 (Fig. 9). 
Mechanistically, revenues and D&A grew faster than total LTA between 2010 and 
2015, causing LTAT to grow and UL to shrink.  
 Using the MC simulation, we estimate an average LTAT of 1.08 over the 
next 10 years and an average UL of 14.17. Estimated LTAT in particular is above 
its historical and present values, but this simply represents PGNiG growing its 
revenues slightly faster than it grows its LTA indicative of a recovering crude oil 
price.  
One likely scenario is that PGNiG continues to grow through acquisitions, 
such as its pursuit of EDF’s Polish plants. If this is the case, total LTA may 
receive a boost and average LTAT over the next 10 years may fall closer to 
present day levels. However, acquisitions require capital expenditures (CAPEX), 
and our model finds that estimated FCF / share is highly sensitive to CAPEX, 
particularly near the end of our 10-year PDCF scope (see Sensitivity Analysis). 
Thus, growth entirely through acquisitions is not realistically feasible, and PGNiG 
must be able to grow revenue without growing their asset base in order to 





Figure 9: Historical and Estimated LTAT and UL. The black dotted line 




 The Probabilistic Discounted Cash Flow (PDCF) for PGNiG is based on 
primary data published directly by the company. Using these data, we 
established 6-year averages for the revenue growth rate of PGNiG’s business 
segments.  
Revenues for FY 2016 have not yet been published, but we estimated 
revenues based on Q1-Q3 performance. Intuitively, revenues for a fiscal year 
could and would be calculated by multiplying the revenue of Q1 through Q3 by 
4/3, assuming linear extrapolation. However, PGNiG’s quarterly sales tend to 
cyclically rise in Q1 and Q4 and shrink in Q2 and Q3, since the colder winter 
months see a higher usage of gas for heating. We performed an empirical 
analysis of the historical ratio between annual revenue and Q1 through Q3 
revenues and found a ratio of 7/5 rather than 4/3. 
 We also calculated costs allotted to CAPEX, change in working capital, 
and taxes. D&A is extracted from costs of sales and is deducted as a component 
of CAPEX. 
 It is worth noting that if, for each of the next 10 years, PGNiG generates 
the same revenue as it did in 2015, the estimated FCF/share would be PLN 6.35, 



























according to the oil-gold ratio to approximately $70/bbl - $80/bbl and we assume 
that the PGNiG’s revenue is directly tied to the price of oil, then the company 
should generate similar stellar revenues as it did in late 2014 and early 2015. If, 
subsequently, PGNiG generated that annual revenue for the next 10 years in our 
PDCF, we find an estimated share price as stated above, and we find that the 
company’s market value would generally reflect its fundamental value.  
 
Balance Sheet and Income Statement 
Results can be found in accompanying spreadsheet, Balance Sheet and Income Statement 
tabs 
 PGNiG has grown its books over the last 6 years, with total assets and 
total liabilities + equity growing from PLN 34bn to PLN 49bn. The ongoing 
negotiations for EDF’s Polish plants suggests that PGNiG seeks to continue 
growing its balance sheet over the coming years as well. 
Within the balance sheet, the total value of property, plant, and equipment 
grew from PLN 26bn to PLN 33bn, and cash on hand grew from PLN 1.3bn to 
PLN 5.5bn (Appendix 2). In addition, total retained earnings have grown from 
PLN 16bn in 2010 to PLN 24bn in 2016. Notably, long-term debt grew from less 
than PLN 1bn to almost PLN 6bn between 2010 and 2015, but almost all of this 
was converted to short-term debt in 2016 (Appendix 3). Between 2015 and 2016, 
long-term debt decreased from PLN 5.8bn to PLN 1.4bn and short-term debt 
increased from PLN 0.6bn to PLN 5bn. This suggests that PGNiG will attempt to 
heavily deleverage in 2017, and we indeed find that PLN 2.5bn of debt matures 
in 2017 (Appendix 4).  
Inspection of the income statement reveals that revenue is expected to 
take a hit in 2016, primarily due to poor performance from the T&S segment (Fig. 
10). Earnings per share is expected to drop slightly from PLN 0.39 to PLN 0.37. 
 
 
Figure 10: Historical and Estimated Revenue and EPS 





Results can be found in accompanying spreadsheet, Value Drivers tab 
 We analyze the drivers of PGNiG’s value and costs by determining cost 
margins on revenue over time.  
 First, we notice a strong growth of revenue over time, except for the year 
of 2016. On average, year-over-year (YoY) revenue growth was 11.57% between 
2010 and 2015 but only 7.03% between 2010 and 2016. This reflects a decline in 
expected total sales of 12% in 2016 alone. 
 The cost margin of Raw and Other Materials Used has rapidly increased 
due to an increased cost of gas sold. The margin rose from 54.86% in 2010 to 
66.41% in 2015. However, over this same time period, margins for employee 
benefits and contracted services decreased, likely reflecting the increase in input 
costs. Thus, EBITDA remained at approximately 18% margin on revenue for this 
six-year period. Margins for Raw and Other Materials, Employee Benefits, and 
Contracted Services are therefore set to 65.00%, 8.00%, and 7.72% margin on 
revenue respectively, in order to better represent PGNiG’s most recent cost 
structure. 
 CAPEX was high in 2011 and 2012, at over 20% margin on revenue. This 
is due to an expense of approximately PLN 3bn in 2012 to acquire PGNiG 
Termika. Since then, however, CAPEX has decreased and remained consistently 
at approximately 8% margin. However, since PGNiG has grown its LTA over the 
last 6 years, we seek to model this growth of assets into the future as well. To do 
this, we set CAPEX margin at 9% margin on revenue for each of the 10 years in 
our PDCF. This margin sees total LTA increasing from PLN 37bn to PLN 44bn in 
2026.  
D&A expenses, on the other hand, have been remarkably consistent with 
a margin on revenue of approximately 7.5% for the last 6 years. This suggests 
that PGNiG is able to effectively manage the depreciation and wear of its assets. 
Regarding income tax, we calculate and estimate PGNiG’s income tax as 
a margin on their Earnings Before Taxes (EBT) in order to see through any tax 
shielding that may occur. We find that the income tax margin on EBT has been 
significantly higher between 2013 and the present than it was between 2010 and 
2012. Thus, we will set the income tax margin at 26.82% margin on EBT, with 
standard deviation of 4.02%. This will better represent PGNiG’s current tax 
management policies.  
 Finally, it is worth noting that the most recent LTAT and UL ratios are 0.99 
and 13.25 respectively. The estimated average LTAT and UL are close to these 
values as well. 
 
Projected Revenue Growth 
Results can be found in accompanying spreadsheet, Revenue Growth Tab 
 The two primary sources of revenue for PGNiG are its E&P segment and 
T&S segment (Fig. 11). As mentioned previously, E&P revenues were hurt by 
low oil prices in 2015 and remained low in 2016. When oil prices were high or 
rising between 2010 and 2014, however, the segment saw healthy growth from 
revenues of PLN 2.2bn to PLN 4,3bn. PGNiG has stated in investor 
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presentations that they are committed to strengthening their E&P segment. To 
account for this, we set E&P YoY revenue growth to 7%, which is slightly lower 
than the historical average. 
 T&S segment revenues grew at an incredible rate between 2010 and 
2015, with a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10.83% during that 
time. This segment’s revenues were hurt in 2016 due to lower unit gas purchase 
costs coupled with pressure on selling prices. In estimatinig the revenue of this 
segment, we admit that crude oil prices are increasing but we must remain 
cautiously optimistic. As a result, we set T&S YoY revenue growth to 5% -- lower 
than the historical average, but non-negative regardless. 
 Growth for PGNiG’s distribution segment is assumed to be 10% YoY, as 
opposed to the 44.90% average YoY growth. Because the total revenue from this 
segment is so low, increases in revenue from PLN 208M to PLN 654M, for 
example, are represented as a 133.38% growth in revenue. Clearly, this is not a 
realistic growth rate for the next 10 years. 
 PGNiG’s generation segment was formed in 2012 and has generated 
relatively constant revenues over that time. This segment makes up only ~4% of 
PGNiG’s total revenue and its YoY growth rate is held at 3%. 
 Finally, we incorporated revenues from the contract with ArcelorMittal into 
PGNiG’s revenue growth. The contract details the supply of PLN 1.4bn worth of 
natural gas from PGNiG to ArcelorMittal over the next three years and this 
revenue is uniformly distributed across the period of 2017-2020. 
  Total revenue growth fluctuated heavily in our historical sample and the 
standard deviations of YoY revenue growth is very high for all business 
segments. This high variance is a drawback of this model. 
 
Figure 11: Historical Revenue by Business Segment 
 
PDCF Assumptions 
Results can be found in accompanying spreadsheet, PDCF tab 
 Margins on revenue for operating costs (Raw and other materials used, 
Employee Benefits, Contracted Services, Cost of Products and Services for Own 
Needs, Other) were generated using historical averages. The historical standard 
deviations of these cost margins are low, so there is little evidence to suggest 
that these margins would be significantly out of line with their historical values.  
 A summary of all other margins used in the PDCF is below. Explanations 
for these margins can be found in the appropriate sections above. 
 
• Raw and Other Materials: 65% Margin on Revenue. 
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• Employee Benefits: 8% Margin on Revenue. 
• Contracted Services: 7.72% Margin on Revenue. 
• CAPEX: 9% Margin on Revenue. 
• D&A: 7.47% Margin on Revenue (Hist. Avg.). 
• Income Tax: 25% Margin on EBT. 
• E&P segment growth: 7% YoY. 
• T&S segment growth: 5% YoY. 
• Distribution segment YoY growth: 10%. 
• Generation Segment YoY growth: 3%. 
 
Results and Discussion of Model 
Results can be found in accompanying spreadsheet, Monte Carlo Tab 
The results of the Monte Carlo Simulation can be found below. We tracked 
seven distinct parameters: Estimated FCF / Share, LTAT, Implied Price-to-
Earnings Ratio (P/E), Free Cash Flow Return on Invested Capital (FROIC), 
Potential Free Cash Flow Yield (PFCFY), Percent of Invested Capital in Long 
Term Assets (LTA/IC), and Earnings per Share (EPS).  
In our PDCF, we estimate the parameters each year for 10 years into the 
future. The following histograms, however, are of the average for each parameter 
over this 10-year period. Subsequently, the mean of the histogram represents an 
average of averages.  We have not included the results of P/E and EPS for 
brevity. 
 
FCF / Share 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of expected FCF / share (PLN) 
 
The expected FCF per share of PLN 6.91 is higher than the current share 
price of PLN 6.09 (Fig 12). However, the spread of FCF estimates is very high 
and the margin of safety is small. This high variance is likely due to extremely 
high variance within the revenue growth rate estimates. Currently, the 50th 
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Figure 16: Distribution of average LTA/IC 
 
 Figures 13-16 above show the output distributions for PFCFY, LTAT, 
FROIC, and LTA/IC. In order to properly tune our PDCF, these metrics should fall 
in line with historical values or accurately account for any expected changes to 
the company’s operations. We can see that estimated PFCFY, FROIC, and 
LTA/IC all fall within their historical bounds, indicating that we have accurately 
tuned the model for estimated. Estimated LTAT is expected to rise slightly above 
its historical bounds, but PGNiG’s LTAT has risen over the last 5 years as well, 
rising from 0.76 in 2010 to 0.99 in 2015. For LTAT to continue rising in the future, 
revenues must continue to rise at a faster rate than total LTA and this condition 
should be met assuming crude oil prices also continue their ascent. 
 Ultimately, the outputs from the Monte Carlo simulation suggest that 
PGNiG’s is somewhat undervalued. We can be confident in our model’s realism 
and accuracy because our model tuning parameters are well within historical 
ranges. For example, our expected FCF/share and EPS are not contingent on a 
wildly increasing potential FCF yield, or on an unrealistic LTAT. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 In order to quantify how much each parameter in our model contributes to 
the overall uncertainty and variance, we perform a sensitivity analysis. Through 
this analysis, we can determine which of the 150+ parameters in the PDCF have 
unusually high correlations with FCF/share, and take steps to determine if this 
seems justified or is a flaw in our assumption set. 
 We performed two ‘rounds’ of sensitivity analyses, with each round 
composed of: 
 1) Gathering the top 25 parameters with the highest correlation with FCF/share 
in the PDCF. 
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2) Adjusting the Monte Carlo assumptions for the highest correlation parameters 
accordingly. 
3) Generating a new distribution for the estimated FCF/share. 
 
Round 1   
 
Figure 17a: Rank Correlation for the first round of sensitivity analysis. The blue 
bar with correlation of -0.83 represents the correlation of CAPEX margin in year 
10 with FCF/share 
 
 






Figure 17c: New distribution of FCF/share after setting CAPEX margin in year 10 
to a constant 
 
 After running the model as described in the above sections, a rank 
correlation calculation found the CAPEX margin on revenue in year 10 to have a 
correlation of -0.88 with estimated FCF/share (Fig. 17a). As a result, for any 
given value of this CAPEX margin, the range of possible FCF/share estimates 
was extremely tight (Fig 17b). We thus set this margin to a constant 9%, rather 
than a distribution with mean 9%, and found that the spread of the FCF/share 
distribution was markedly lower, but the mean remained the same. This shows 
that we were able to decrease variance in our estimates without affecting the 
interpretation of the estimates. 
 
Round 2  
 
 





Figure 18b: Scatter plot of COGS margin (left) and Employee Benefits (right) 
margin against FCF/share 
 
 
Figure 18c: New distribution of FCF/share 
 
In the rank correlation for the second round of sensitivity analyses, the 
blue bar with correlation of -0.51, the red bar with correlation of -0.43, and teal 
bar with correlation -0.29 refer to the COGS margin in year 10, Employee 
Benefits margin in year 10, and Contracted Services margin in year 10 
respectively (Fig 18a). As shown in the scatter plots, any given value for either 
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the COGS margin or Employee Benefits margin still constrains the FCF/share 
estimate. Again, we set the margins for each of these three operating costs in 
year 10 to a constant, rather than a distribution. After doing this, the spread of the 
distribution for FCF/share decreased again, but the mean of the distribution 
remained at approximately PLN 6.91, which does not change our interpretation of 
the Monte Carlo.  
After performing the rank correlation a third and final time, all correlations 
were less than 0.33 and the scatter plots were appropriately distributed.  
 
Management Compensation 
Details on short and long term management compensation metrics are 
unavailable. However, some general goals for PGNiG were obtained from their 
earnings calls and investor presentation: 
• Increase EBITDA to approximately PLN 7.4bn in 2022. 
o Our PDCF and MC model estimates EBITDA at PLN 7.8bn in 2022. 
• Maintain stable value of sales. 
• Maximize cash flow from infrastructure and generation. 
• Strengthen exploration and production area. 
Conclusion and Investment Decision 
 The story of PGNiG is highly tied to the price of crude oil. When oil prices 
were relatively high and increasing between 2010 and 2015, revenue from 
PGNiG’s business segment grew rapidly, and the share price grew, as well. 
During 2013 and 2015 in particular, share price jumped up for the entire year. 
Over the same time period, between 2010 and 2015, cost margins for materials 
used increased significantly, but PGNiG also managed to cut down on costs 
allocated for employee benefits and contracted services, allowing them to 
maintain stable EBITDA. The bottoming out of oil in late 2015 and early 2016, 
however, significantly hurt revenues across the board, and oil price is the biggest 
question mark in the valuation of PGNiG. If oil prices continue to rise and 
stabilize, as they have done since the price floored, then the company stands to 
see significant revenue and value growth from their T&S and E&P segments, 
both of which saw double digit YoY growth between 2010 and 2015. Currently, oil 
prices are similar to their early-2015 value, suggesting that segment revenues 
may be able to return to 2015 levels. Past that, the future is unclear. Thus, our 
investment decision is to HOLD until more information on the direction of oil 






























Appendix 2: Short-term, Long-term and Total Debt. Note the conversion from 
long-term to short-term debt in late 2016  
 
 





Appendix 4: Debt Maturation. Note the PLN 2.5bn maturation value in 2017 
 
 






Appendix 6: Insider Transactions 
 
 





Appendix 8: Shareholders. Poland State Treasury owns over 70% of shares. 
 
 
Appendix 9: Relative Valuation 
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